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Briefing for Dr. Hall, ASD(I), DCI Conference Room, Thursday, 16 March 72

Opening Remarks

Mr. Bronson Tweedy, D/DCI/IC

Our objective this morning is to describe for you the history and current status of the Consolidated Intelligence Resources Information System, commonly known as CIRIS, and then to acquaint you with our ideas for improvements to the system and the uses which we believe it can serve in the Community. Our purpose in doing this is to solicit your understanding of the system and to invite your participation in further development and utilization of the system.

Part I of this briefing will be presented by Mr. Nathan C. Fitts and will deal with historical aspects. The second part will be presented by Rear Admiral Donald M. Showers and will concern current and potential uses and the further development of CIRIS.

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1. The history of efforts to assemble on an annual basis resources information on the national intelligence community goes back at least 19 years. Each year since 1954, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), as part of his coordination responsibilities, has utilized community mechanisms to collect this information to use in an overview and summary of the magnitude and general mix and focus of the United States foreign intelligence effort.

2. Annually from 1954 through 1960, the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), later renamed the United States Intelligence Board (USIB), provided an interagency channel through which resource statistics were gathered. An interagency working group under the IAC/USIB, called the Cost Estimates Subcommittee, agreed on a common vocabulary to identify intelligence organizations and their components and intelligence functions and techniques. This committee also served to process the information received.

3. The DCI used this information to make required responses to Congressional inquiries and to report to the White House and the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities.

4. The effort to bring USIB members into meaningful participation in community resource matters during the 1950s and early 60s must be evaluated as being not very successful as a practical matter. USIB members did not succeed in implementing a process of periodic review that would assist in the coordination of the foreign intelligence effort.

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4. ~~E~~. Starting with President Kennedy, a series of Presidents have instructed a series of DCIs to give special attention to coordination and effective guidance of the total United States foreign intelligence effort. President Kennedy identified these community-wide responsibilities as the "primary task" of the DCI, and directed him to "maintain a continuing review of the programs and activities of all U.S. agencies engaged in foreign intelligence activities."

5. ~~E~~. Mr. McCone, who succeeded Mr. Dulles as DCI, established in 1963 a Deputy for National Intelligence Program Evaluation (D/DCI/NIPE) and Mr. John A. Bross was named to that position. Mr. McCone stated:

"Initially it is my intention that Mr. Bross and his staff concern themselves primarily with the development of a community-wide intelligence activity inventory, to establish the totality of the U.S. foreign intelligence effort in terms of activities performed, their objectives, and the resources committed to their support. ... "

6. ~~E~~. In the middle years of the decade of the 1960s, an increasing number of studies was produced to describe and evaluate selected aspects of the intelligence business. All of these studies sought to gain a focus that would encompass the entire national intelligence community and sometimes even beyond. These studies, of which the most important were truly major efforts, provide a practical demonstration of the increasing recognition that intelligence should be looked at as a totality with many interacting sub-systems. Included in these study efforts were such topics as:

Development of a National ELINT Plan. (Resources Appendix dated 10 June 1963.)

Joint Study of the Defense Department Representation Abroad (1964). (Conducted by Defense, State and BoB.)

Middle East Task Force Report (May 1964). ("To evaluate the intelligence effort against 10 Middle East countries and to determine what problems are inherent in attempting to identify the 'totality' of intelligence activity on any given area or subject." Included chapter on costs and manpower. Sponsored by the DCI.)

Report of Joint Imagery Interpretation Review Group (JIIRG) (September 1966). (Resource and organizational needs for the expanding function of Imagery processing.)

Cuba Post Mortems. (Reports to the President's Board and reviews within the community on various aspects of the performance of intelligence in the Cuba missile crisis.)

Report on Strategic Warning. (1967). ("A study in depth of the performance, planning and present and foreseeable future problems of the U.S. intelligence community in carrying out its Early Warning mission." One portion of this study dealt with costs.)

7. ~~4~~ Throughout the 1960s, the DCI/NIPE organization continued to compile annual statistics on the intelligence community. DCI/NIPE participation in the annual Defense program reviews began in 1963. The program review process provided some of the data needed for community statistics, but did not provide any uniform and comprehensive picture of the allocation of resources to geographic and subject targets.

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8. ~~2~~ Proposal for a Target-Oriented Display for the Intelligence Community. In the latter part of 1966, the Director, Bureau of the Budget wrote to the DCI and to the Secretary of Defense to express his concern

"... about the need for providing a better management mechanism for determining and relating requirements and resource allocation for the national intelligence effort."

The Director BoB enclosed a study, prepared by Harry Rowen, ~~which addressed this problem~~, and which suggested the use of a target-oriented program structure in both CIA and the Department of Defense.

9. ~~9.~~ Developing Terms of Reference for Target-Oriented Display. Letters were exchanged among the Director BoB, the DCI and the Deputy Secretary of Defense (then Mr. Cyrus Vance) in early April 1967. It was agreed that representatives of these Principals (~~also called Sponsors~~) would develop terms of reference for this project.

10. ~~10.~~ Summary of Agreed Terms of Reference. The three Principals approved the terms of reference in August 1967. Highlights include the following:

a. The TOD "will be developed (to) show how U.S. intelligence resources are directed against major intelligence requirements. The purpose of the display is to aid in a more precise analysis of the allocation of resources to intelligence targets. ..."

b. "The display will show how U.S. intelligence resources have been and currently are targetted against countries and regions. For the Soviet Union, China, and possibly other selected countries or regions, resources will be displayed in greater detail against specific military, economic, and political targets. ..."

c. "The display will also include other resource data related to targets and classified by:

"a. Intelligence functions, including: various types of collection, production, mapping and charting, and counterintelligence.

"b. Cost categories including investment, operating expenses and research and development.

"c. The various programs whose resources are included in the display."

d. The terms of reference instructed the initial display to consist of two fiscal years of targeted data (FYs 67 and 68).

e. The three Principals agreed to include the following programs: all of the CCP; all of the CIP (GDIP); all of the Special Air Force Program; all of CIA except for Covert Action; all of the MOL Program; and one-third of the SR-71 program (the other two-thirds being considered operational and not intelligence).

f. Data sources on which the TOD was to be built were identified so that the TOD allocations could be related to approved programming and budgeting totals.

g. Security and information control provisions were made the responsibility of the DCI, to be determined upon completion of the display products.

h. An Interagency TOD Committee was established.

(1) "The display will be prepared under the guidance of a committee composed of representatives of the Secretary of Defense, the DCI and the Director BoB. The committee will be chaired by the representative of the DCI."

(2) "It is essential that (CIA, [redacted] organization, NSA and DIA) work closely with the committee ... To achieve these ends, these four agencies will provide non-voting members of the committee."

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i. Defense Data Calls. " ... (These) will be issued by the representative of the Secretary of Defense in accordance with needs developed by the committee."

11. ~~Preparation~~ Preparation of Initial Target-Oriented Display (TOD-I, 1967-8).

The new Interagency TOD Committee worked from August until mid-November 1967 to develop an initial data call and the instructions and data submission forms. CIA and DoD calls were issued in November.

12. ~~An~~ An initial set of displays was reviewed in May 1968 by ASD(SA) and the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Messrs. Enthoven and Nitze). The latter concurred that the initial results were of such promise as to warrant a follow-on exercise. Guidance was provided for the incorporation of improved features in the second version. For example, the DoD representative desired an expansion of the descriptive information that pertained to the equipment and techniques employed on intelligence missions. The initial TOD was intended to be developmental and not for general use. It did however stimulate further study by the Critical Collection Problems Committee of USIB (CCPC) on the appropriate future level of resources targeted against Cuba. This was a case of the use of TOD to call attention to a resource allocation in the community that appeared to warrant further investigation.

14. TOD-II, 1969. Data calls were issued in January 1969. From a system development standpoint, the major feature of the 1969 exercise was to make a first cut at improving the interrelationships between the organizational terminology used by the CCP and that used by the other intelligence programs.

15. CIRIS-70, 1970. At the 12 November 1969 meeting of the National Intelligence Resources Board, the NIRB adopted Mr. Froehle's suggestion that the TOD should be renamed the Consolidated Intelligence Resources Information System (CIRIS). The CIRIS data call for calendar year 1970 was approved at this meeting.

16. Admiral Gayler, Director NSA, participated in that NIRB meeting and a number of succeeding NIRB meetings. Arrangements were worked out to fully interrelate the CIRIS mechanism and the CCP internal management data structure. Other agreements provided that the CCP should make its CIRIS submissions in the form of compatible computer tape inputs. In terms of system development for CIRIS, progress was made at the technical level on the procedures for interfacing the NSA and DCI computer mechanisms supporting the CCP and CIRIS.

17. As Admiral Showers will describe in his portion of this briefing, CIRIS information compiled in 1970 was used to provide an overview of current patterns of intelligence resource use. This served as one reference point for the extensive study conducted by General Jack Thomas' interagency Intelligence Objectives and Priorities Working Group.

16. ~~16.~~ CIRIS-71, 1971. Data calls were approved and issued in November 1970, to cover calendar year 1971. A further step to upgrade the CIRIS data display capability was to develop the computer programs so as to permit every country in the world to be target-oriented -- the CIRIS data call only required that a select list of the more important countries be identified, but CIRIS offered the optional capability to Program Managers to tabulate information for them on other geographic targets, provided the Program Manager saw fit to call on his Reporting Entities to make such inputs. Another improvement by way of system building involved a study conducted by the CIA Clandestine Services which resulted in improvements in their targeted submissions to CIRIS. Also in last year's CIRIS, the NSA data system and CIRIS achieved total compatibility -- to the extent that NSA was able to report last fall that they incurred no costs attributable uniquely to CIRIS beyond the cost of preparing tapes to send to the DCI.

17. ~~17.~~ The major problem experienced in the 1971 cycle related to the attempt to provide information to DASD(I) in a timely fashion and in a convenient format in order to contribute to the CDIP review process. This was largely unsuccessful from the DASD(I) point of view, ~~which was a major problem~~ ~~and this score was well-founded.~~ On the other hand, DCI analysts involved in the CDIP review did make use of CIRIS data, particularly in the preparation of the Substantive Impact Statements that accompanied the DASD(I) "black book" of resource decisions.

18. ~~18.~~ In a post mortem examination of this problem last fall, the DCI's CIRIS organization and computer people developed some new software appli-

cations that permit fiscal data, as presented in the FYDP, to be manipulated quite rapidly.

19. ~~22~~. In the area of continuing improvements to methodology for CIRIS, we would like to test procedures and logic for allocating untargeted resources to specific targets, and also to use updates of fiscal (FYDP-type) information plus targeting patterns from prior years to develop models of resources allocated to targets in a future year.

20. ~~22~~. One characteristic of CIRIS as developed up to this point is very apparent. CIRIS was designed to present costs in relation to targets. It does not purport to deal qualitatively with "value" or "effectiveness".

The CIRIS development effort has now brought us to the point where we have a satisfactory mechanism to express how resources are applied in a quantitative sense. Having stabilized that portion of the equation, we have a more solid basis for investigations and tests to get at measuring effectiveness. This has been characterized as an "intellectual problem of depth and subtlety." I hope the DCI and DoD intelligence organizations can go at this together in the coming months.

21. ~~22~~. Admiral Showers is going to present to you a more detailed appraisal of CIRIS uses and describe how the DCI's Intelligence Community staff believes the CIRIS mechanism can be made more timely and more convenient for users. I would conclude by saying that the process of developing this community mechanism over the past four years or more leads one to see that this kind of device has varying capabilities to support different types of uses. Some it can support more effectively than others. A full appraisal of the mechanism should take account of all of these uses. Admiral Showers will now continue this discussion.